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 Existing literature on NGOs in China depicted NGOs as either depoliticized service 
providers or harbinger of democracy expecting them to mobilize movements or 
participate in policy advocacy. However, few explain what accounts for differences in 
their capacities. While some scholars argue that NGOs’ relations with different actors in 
the field have influence on variations of their capacities, they do not disaggregate what 
resources are mobilized in such relationship management. Extending their arguments, I 
argue that NGOs leverage relationships to obtain essential resources such as symbolic 
legitimation from the state, financial support from civil society actors and social 
embeddedness from constituencies to operate effectively. Drawing upon four months 
ethnography on three NGOs serving the needs of sex workers in greater China region, I 
illustrate how these NGOs are either capable of carrying out their original political 
mission—to decriminalize sex work in China—or deflected into service provision, 
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On July 1st 2018, crowds of people marched on the street of Hong Kong, marking its 
traditional rally on that day (figure 1). Crowds roar “people power!” while holding placards with 
various political agendas written on them. On one of the placards, I saw “sex work is work,” 
reminding me of another plaque I saw in the new office of the NGO in mainland China I was 
interning for. A couple of weeks ago, I just helped this NGO serving sex workers in Shenzhen—
several miles away from Hong Kong—to move into its new office due to soft repression by the 
local police. After unpacking, the director placed the registration certificate sealed in a photo 
frame solemnly on its shelves, hoping it can bless the NGO away from another crackdown. A 
year later, on the wall of another NGO in an inner land city Tianjin, hung yet plaques different 
from those I saw in the other settings: its silver-colored award plaques reading “level AAA social 
organization” and “outstanding organization” respectively. On the opposite wall a picture 
captures its director and two other staff standing alongside Peng Liyuan, wife of Xi Jinping.  
  
Figure 1. Rally on July 1st 2018. Photo by Fengrui Tian 
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In various political settings, these three forms of placards and plaques represent different 
symbols for each civil society organizations. In Hong Kong, citizens concerned with rights 
protection for sex workers can hold up high their political mission, pressuring the state to make a 
move; in mainland China, those political mission translate into certificate and evaluation of 
legitimate status granted by the state. What accounts for such variation? Why are some 
organizations more political capable of shouldering rights or policy advocacy while others 
maintain a close relationship with the state? This paper starts with these questions.  
Many literature accentuate the importance of either social capital or institutional 
embeddedness, in the form of NGOs’ relations with various actors in the field—the state, other 
civil society actors, and their constituencies—to explain the variegated nature of their capacities 
(Franceschini 2014; Yuen 2018). However, they do not differentiate between these relations or 
explain how or why NGOs leverage these relationships that enable or disable them to accomplish 
their long-term political missions. Drawing upon ethnography data from three NGOs serving the 
needs of sex workers in greater China—two NGOs in mainland China and one NGO in Hong 
Kong—I illustrate how their activities and capacities to carry out their missions are influenced by 
how NGOs mobilize different resources through leveraging their relationships with other 
essential actors.  
I argue that NGOs in China differ in their ways to leverage their relations with the local 
state, civil society actors and constituencies to mobilize resources such as symbolic legitimation, 
financial support and social embeddedness. This variation is manifest in two ways. First the 
requirements to obtain certain resources while not others vary by the political context that NGOs 
are embedded in. For instance, NGO in Hong Kong does not require symbolic legitimation from 
the state as its counterpart in mainland China do. Second even in the same context, one type of 
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resource has potential influence on facilitating or undermining the attainment of others. For 
instance, in mainland China, symbolic legitimation from the state can impede the financial 
support from international private foundations to NGOs in China yet can deepen their social 
embeddedness within their constituencies by lending NGOs more legitimacy. As a result, NGOs 
display variation in their capacity of carrying out their political missions.  
In the following sections, I will first lay out the political context in which Chinese NGOs 
operate, illustrating a nascent thus whimsical field where the state exerts cycles of relaxing and 
constraining controls over civil society in China. Followed by the background section I illustrate 
the variegated nature of NGOs in China and how their activities have been studied as influenced 
by various forms of their interactions with other state and societal actors. Finally, drawing upon 
data collected on three NGOs serving the needs of sex workers, I first extend previous literature 
by delineating how the three cases vary in their ways of resource mobilization and thus in their 
ability to accomplish their political goals.  
GOVERNING NGOS IN CHINA 
 A civil society built by grassroots actors and exist rather independently from the state is a 
relatively recent concept in China. During the Maoist period, civil society organizations were 
outlawed in China, with the exception of professional associations which were established and 
organized by state organs. The central state treated these associations as “transmission belts” or 
intermediaries facilitating social surveillance and control, and recognized the need for these 
organizations as a means to control influential constituencies such as workers, peasants, and 
businessmen (Ma 2002a; Unger and Chan 1995; Unger 1996).  
When grassroots organizations emerged in late 1970s, the state treated these 
organizations’ existence as a stopgap measure for incomplete welfare reforms. The “reform and 
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opening up” policy in 1978 brought substantial transition to a market economy but also left holes 
in a social welfare system that was formerly monopolized by the state. Specifically, the collapse 
of work unit (danwei) system—which was the main welfare provider—created the needs of 
alternative organizations for service and welfare provision (Howell 2004). To solve the 
incapacity of the state generated by 1987 reform, the state called on grassroots NGOs to fill in 
the holes and help to solve social problems (Saich 2000; Ho 2001; Ma 2002b; Howell 2004; 
Deng 2010). Regulation of these social associations was minimal until in 1989 when in response 
to the Tiananmen Square Movement the state bolstered its repression of large-scale associations 
for fear of their threat to its legitimacy (Simon 2013).  
In the aftermath of Tiananmen Square Movement, state management and regulation 
toward social organizations were formalized for the first time to address both the dilemma of the 
imperative of expanding the welfare function of social organizations and the party-state’s wish to 
extend its control over all societal sectors (Saich 2000). In 1998, the Jiang Zemin administration 
recognized the important role social organizations could play but the expansion of the social 
organization sector was at odds with state’s “Leninist predisposition”, which precludes the 
plurality of organizations (Saich 2000). Consequently, the central government promulgated a set 
of regulations regarding social organizations which clarified the rules and policies for social 
organizations to operate legally.1  
 These regulations formed the basis of NGO governance today. They require NGOs to 
register dually, both with Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) and a supervisory management unit 
that is another government agency (Saich 2000). This has since become a considerable hurdle for 
 
1 Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Associations and Provisional 
Regulations for the Registration and Management of Civil Non-Enterprises Institutions in 1998. 
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grassroots NGOs, especially those lacking networks or resources to find a sponsor government 
agency to supervise them in obtaining legal status. Those organizations that remain unregistered 
organizations become illegal entities and thus cannot form contractual relations, open bank 
accounts, or provide transparent finance records (Ho 2001). This dual management system 
allows the state to place civil society organizations under close surveillance and cooptation, or 
choke off their existence entirely.  
NGOs in China, however, find various ways to evade the strict regulations. Some register 
with the Industrial and Commercial Bureau as business enterprises; others operate as branches of 
dormant organizations (Lu 2008). Still others simply choose not to register and thus remain 
underground.  
For registered NGOs, relations with state had been collaborative in general. In the late 
2000s, the state formed a strategy of what Teets (2013) calls “consultative authoritarianism” that 
at once tolerates the development of civil society and deploys more indirect and nuanced control 
over society. The state encourages development of NGOs in certain service provision realms 
while repressing others.2 For example, after a series of natural disasters in the 2000s culminating 
in the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the state recognized particular NGOs, but emphasized their 
role as service providers.3 Accordingly, the 12th Five-Year Plan of 2011 addressed social 
organizations for the first time, recognizing their assistance in the development of the state (Han 
2018). Such recognition at once brought opportunities for partnership between NGOs and the 
state but also channeled functions of NGOs to service delivery only.  
 
2 A third round of regulations in 2016 and 2017 further consolidates this strategy (Han 2018). 
3 The earthquake not only drew considerable resources to disaster relief from non-profit sectors 
(Shieh and Deng 2011; Han 2018; Gao 2019) but also cultivated volunteerism and philanthropy 
in a new generation of citizens (Hsu 2010; Han 2018). Chinese media even called 2008 “Year of 
the Volunteer” or the “Year of Civil Society” (Shieh and Deng 2011). 
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Since Xi Jinping’s administration in 2013, a third round of regulations and legislation 
simultaneously provided legal status for NGOs for the first time, and placed them under a system 
of disciplinary surveillance.4  Consistent with Xi’s “governance by law” (yifa zhiguo) approach, 
this new regime introduces a closer relation between local governments and NGOs. First, it 
encourages local governments to award contracts to NGOs which carry out vital social services 
functions in their jurisdiction (Howell 2015; Yuen 2018; Kang 2019). Second, local government 
bodies then provide annual evaluations of NGO performance (Kang 2019). Though the level 
evaluation is not mandatory, NGOs passed the evaluation are trusted by the governments, thus 
are more likely to be chosen to collaborate on government projects (Kang 2019). Accordingly, 
those with poor performances, particularly those with activities considered by the state are 
subject to withdrawal of their registered status. Third, the central state began to selectively relax 
the dual registration requirement specifically for NGOs operating in areas such as science and 
technology, community social services, and public-benefits (Howell 2015; Kang 2019).5   
While this legal institutionalization of NGO governance rewards benign NGOs offering 
services that correspond to the state’s needs, it penalizes those posing a potential threat to 
“national security” (Han 2018). It constrains NGOs seeking to accomplish policy advocacy goals 
(Yuen 2018). In contrast to the previous Hu Jintao administration which tolerated certain levels 
of dissidence and activism, Xi’s leadership is marked by downright crackdown of contentious 
actions. If the Hu administration encouraged a fragmented civil society, then the Xi 
administration, by framing transgressions as national security matters, criminalizing dissidents 
 
4 These laws and regulations are: Charity Law, Overseas NGO Law and Draft regulations on 
registration and management of three different types of social organizations (Han 2018).  
5 In addition, the Charity Law, effective in 2016 granted social organizations registered as 
charitable organizations benefit of public fundraising, which was not allowed for former civil 
non-enterprise institutions or social associations. 
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and repressing preemptively, has consolidated repression (Fu and Distelhorst 2018). Many 
human right lawyers, labor activists, feminists were “disappeared” or publicly criminalized ( Xu 
2017; Fu and Distelhorst 2018). Therefore, NGOs acting in areas such as policy advocacy, 
human rights, and religion were not able to register or would be deregistered if found out (Simon 
2013).  
The state at once limits the capability of civil society organizations through crackdowns 
and repression and depends on them to solve social problems or complement on service 
provision. This interdependent relationship is well reflected in terminologies that scholars 
coined: dependent autonomy (Lu 2008), contingent symbiosis (Spires 2011), and consultative 
authoritarianism (Teets 2013). While there were fewer pressures to adopt such 
institutionalization prior to 2014, after the legal institutionalization since Xi regime, Chinese 
grassroots NGOs have to conceive ways to survive with the presence of more and more 
restrictive rules and regulations that now have legal effect.  
NGOS CAPACITIES 
In other contexts, the central question of studies of civil society revolves around civil 
society’s capacity to facilitate democracy (Fung 2003). However, after witnessing the Chinese 
state’s brutal repression of the Tiananmen Square protests, scholars of China’s civil society have 
had to relinquish their assumption of a public sphere that checks state power. Instead, many 
scholars acknowledge the variegated nature in activities of Chinese civil societies carry out.  
Howell (2004) for instance discerns tensions between a depoliticized civil society concerned 
with “philanthropy, service and public goods” and a politicized public sphere that promotes 
rights and checks state power (Howell 2004: 163). Scholars studying a depoliticized civil society 
in China thus depict civil society organizations as providers of services and public goods, 
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mobilizing resources to survive (Hsu 2010; Hsu and Hasmath 2014). Other scholars view civil 
society organizations as able to mobilize and advocate rights for their constituencies (Fu 2017) 
and participate in policy making process thus altering political outcomes (Ho 2001; Yang 2005; 
Mertha 2009; Zhou 2018).  
While this body of literature contributes to our understanding of various forms of civil 
societies in an authoritarian state, few scholars have examined what accounts for this variegated 
nature in NGOs’ activities. Why are some civil society organizations in China deeply embedded 
in society, while others are coopted by the state? Why are some politically agentic while others 
marginalized? I argue that civil society organizations vary in terms of their capacities to carry out 
their missions and to maintain their positioning among their constituencies, and that this capacity 
is facilitated or constrained by how NGOs leverage their relationships with other actors to 
mobilize different resources.   
Previous literature views the incapacity of NGOs carrying out political missions as a 
consequence of their linkages with both local state and other actors. Lee and Shen (2011) for 
example contend that far from facilitate solidarity, labor NGOs in China are “anti-solidarity 
machines” caught by either state cooptation or market commercialization (Lee and Shen 2011). 
Other scholars emphasize that lack in social capital (Franceschini 2014), represented by their 
weak relations with their constituencies, the state and donors, labor NGOs in China can hardly be 
a “progressive force for political change” (Franceschini 2014). Extending Jing (2018)’s view of 
NGOs in China as both state agents and social actors, Yuen (2018) further proposes institutional 
embeddedness—measured by the difference between the extent of relationships an NGO shares 
with local state actors and the number of external linkages it shares with the civil society 
actors—to explain their relative success in social activism, defined as activism through the 
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delivery of social services to constituencies. Yuen argues that NGOs with balanced institutional 
embeddedness in both state and other society actors can achieve success in service activism 
(Yuen 2018).  
These studies rightly recognize NGOs’ relations with local state actors and other civil 
society actors influencing their capacities in carrying out their political missions. However, they 
do not disaggregate the types of relationships that NGOs build with these actors, or elucidate 
under what conditions NGOs engage them. In doing so, they treat these determinant factors as a 
monolithic conglomerate under the umbrella of either social capital or institutional 
embeddedness. They also obscure that NGOs are strategic actors which leverage social networks 
to mobilize specific resources.  
I build on and extend this literature on NGO embeddedness by asking under what 
conditions, what types of resource mobilization enhance or constrain the political capacity of 
civil society organizations, defined as the extent to which civil society actors can challenge 
central state authority and advocate for its constituencies. In a typical case, NGOs leverage 
relationships with local state and civil society actors for two primary reasons: to gain financial 
support and to build the community rapport required to carry out their social mission. For 
example, many Chinese NGOs are funded by international NGOs like Oxfam or the Ford 
Foundation; and many are mutually interlinked in order to share membership lists. NGOs also 
leverage relationships with constituents that help NGO staff to understand the critical needs of 
their constituencies thus build solidarity among them. However, in an authoritarian regime where 
the central state has selectively criminalized some areas of NGO engagement but not others, 




Symbolic legitimation further intervenes with NGOs’ attainment of the other two 
resources, financial support and social embeddedness. Dual registration, affiliation with local 
governments, and contract work with local state bodies can signal symbolic legitimation to local 
state actors as trusted entities thus viewed as accountable partner for collaboration instead of 
subjects to crackdowns. Symbolic legitimation from the state also ensures potential 
constituencies that individual affiliation with these NGOs will not lead to arrest or police 
harassment. How NGOs leverage their relations with different actors to succeed in or fail to 
access to these resources—financial support, social embeddedness, and symbolic legitimation—
shape their capacities to carry out self-identified political missions.  
DATA AND METHOD 
To assess the types of institutional embeddedness that enable NGOs to act as political 
agents in authoritarian China, I examine three NGOs serving the needs of sex workers.  Sex work 
is particularly subject to legal and political repression in China. Since 1987, sex workers and 
their clients have been legally subject to detentions, fines, and compulsory re-education under 
the Custody and Education system (C&E).6  Furthermore, under the current Xi administration, 
the sex work industry has been caught between corrupt police who customarily collect bribes 
from sex workers in exchange for turning a blind eye to the industry, and a nation-wide police 
“campaign against the black and evil” (saohei chu’e). Despite the controversial nature of sex 
 
6 The Law on Penalties for Administration of Public Security stipulates that sex workers and 
their clients can be detained by police for ten to 15 days and/or fined up to 5,000 yuan.  In 1991, 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the Decision of the Standing Committee 
of the NCP on Strictly Prohibiting Prostitution and the Visiting of Prostitutes (the Decision). In 
1993, State Council promulgated the Measure on the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and 
their Clients (the Measure). It was the Decision that authorized the public security organs to 
force sex workers and their associated clients to “assemble for compulsive education in law and 
morality and participation in productive labor” (Asia Catalyst 2013), and the Measure provides 
detailed ways to practice C&E. 
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work, NGOs in the sex work advocacy space have set a high bar for themselves with regard to 
political capacity: one NGO (included in this study) worked for several years towards pressuring 
the central state to abolish the C&E system. 
In order to capture each NGO’s strategic attempts to cultivate specific political and social 
relationships, I conducted four months of ethnographic fieldwork while working as an unpaid 
NGO volunteer. In 2018 I worked for two months at an NGO in Shenzhen which I call Red Sun 
Center (RSC). During my stay at RSC, I was granted a visit to the second NGO, Honghua in 
Hong Kong. I participated in community outreach activities along with Honghua staff and 
several other RSC staff for 5 days. In 2019 I worked for two months at an NGO in Tianjin, 
which I call Home of Love (HOL). Crucially, all three NGOs share a similar mission—
decriminalize sex work in China.   
All three NGOs are grassroots organizations that are not established by the government. 
Both RSC and HOL are registered at local branches of the Ministry of Civil Administration as 
civil non-enterprise institutions. Honghua on the other hand is an independent NGO that has no 
affiliation with any governmental agencies. All three NGOs are small organizations that consist 
of fewer than five full-time, paid staff members. RSC and Honghua regularly recruit college 
students as interns while HOL recruits sex workers working as volunteers. Given my age and 
gender, I was treated more like an intern than a scholar. This allows me to build rapport with 
both staff members and interns at RSC and HOL. The benefit is that staff were able to reveal 
more openly whatever is on their minds. Therefore, along with formal interviews, I was able to 
gain insights by observing their daily interactions with different actors in the field, such as 
government officials and their beneficiaries.   
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At all three organizations, my regular duty was to engage in community outreach with 
sex workers, accompanied by full-time staff and other interns. In addition, at RSC and HOL, I 
participated in writing up monthly newsletters, organizing events, and helping with 
administrative work. By working closely with NGO personnel, I absorbed individual staff 
members’ viewpoints on their contracts with state agencies, as well as NGO founders’ 
motivations for pursuing strategic partnerships. During outreach visits, I also observed NGO 
personnel interactions with state employees at various local government agencies. Finally, I 
supplement my ethnographic data with four semi-structured, two-hour interviews with NGO 
leadership. I also collected primary literature produced by these NGOs including newsletters. I 
did interviews and transcribed in Chinese, and translated into English. I recorded the interviews 
with the informants’ permission. All the informants are given pseudonyms.  
WAYS OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
This paper, by constructing a three-case comparison between sex workers NGOs 
operating in Hong Kong and mainland China, attempts to illustrate how NGOs leverage their 
relations with the local state, civil society actors, and constituencies to mobilize symbolic 
legitimation, financial support and social embeddedness, has impact on variations of their 
political capacities. In the following sections, I first illustrate how these three NGOs leverage 
their relationships with different actors to succeed in or fail to obtain certain resources. 
Following it I elucidate how the presence or absence of these resources influence on their 
political capacities. To access to more potential constituencies, all three NGOs conduct regular 
outreach to sex workers. The major difference of political capacities thus can be captured in their 





Operating in a civil society that are relatively free from state intervention, Honghua is an 
ideal typical case that does not require symbolic legitimation from the Chinese state to operate 
effectively. Honghua possesses both the financial support independent from state agencies and is 
well-embedded within its local society. It has the long-term goal as decriminalizing sex work in 
Hong Kong and devotes on the mission accordingly.  
Hong Kong, a special administrative region, is governed under a “One Country, Two 
Systems” policy which enables it to have certain degree of political autonomy, and to maintain 
its “capitalistic and democratic core” (Wong et al. 2008). After Hong Kong’s transfer of 
sovereignty from the British back to Chinese rule in 1997, the region has maintained de facto 
autonomy from authoritarian rule. As a result, a nascent yet robust civil society functions in 
Hong Kong: pro-democracy protests such as the Umbrella Movement in 2014 and the 2019 
protests demonstrate a civil society eager to challenge the existing political power. 
In the Hong Kong criminal law system, sex work is not illegal. However, sex work is 
placed in a gray zone where laws restrict certain actions such as solicitation for an immoral 
purpose, living off the earnings of others’ prostitution, etc. (Lim 2008). As a result, sex workers 
in Hong Kong are no less vulnerable from threats. In addition, many sex workers in Hong Kong 
are migrants from mainland China and other countries. They are more vulnerable to violence 
because exposure of identities might provoke deportation due to their illegal status working with 
temporary visas. Honghua thus exists to fight against the violence and protect the basic rights of 
sex workers. 
Due to its location in Hong Kong, Honghua is not subject to state intervention pervasive 
in mainland China thus does not require symbolic legitimation from the local state. Far from 
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requiring the local state’s recognition, Honghua was established to protest against the 
monopolization and abuse of power in hands of the state. Honghua’s initiatives were situated in a 
vibrant labor protest context, that argues the exploitation of sex work is similar to oppressions of 
other forms of labor (Lim 2008). Honghua was established by a group of women activists in 
1996 (Lim 2008). One of Honghua’s early founders is known as a labor activist as she claims 
that she started working for factory unions at a young age (Yan and Yao 2012). On its website, 
Honghua defines itself as an NGO “formed by people of different working experiences. They are 
social workers, labor activists, researchers specializing in women studies and church workers etc. 
who care and concern about the interest and basic rights of women.” Therefore, Honghua 
believes that sex work as a form of legitimate work.  
Honghua enjoys financial autonomy from the state. It secures its funding mostly either 
from international organizations or local charities (Lim 2008) so it does not collaborate with any 
forms of local state agencies. It occasionally has project-oriented fund, but it collaborates with 
churches instead of CDCs. To understand the needs of its constituencies, Honghua outreaches to 
a wide range of sex workers in Hong Kong. The aforementioned leader later became a sex 
workers herself and referred to it as “depraved” together along with sisters (Yan and Yao 2012). 
Honghua thus gradually built reputation among constituencies and even helped to establish 
individual organizations catering to the needs of sex workers with different backgrounds: local 
Hong Kong sex workers, migrant sex workers, and transgender sex worekrs to name only a few 
(Yan and Yao 2012). 
With financial support independent from the state system and a solid standing within its 
constituencies, Honghua thus is able to accomplish its political mission, mobilizing rights for and 
among sex workers (Lim 2008). Honghua mediates relations between society and the state, and 
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given its mission as a legal advocacy group, it at once expands the space for available public 
discourse around sex work and checks state power abuses that violate basic human rights of sex 
workers. For example, Honghua staff often interacted with local Hong Kong police, either to 
appeal for police protection on behalf of sex workers, or to protest corrupt police officers who 
illegally seized sex workers’ profits. In this vein, Honghua is not simply providing social 
services, or filling in the void of social welfare that state fails to accomplish. It exists with an 
explicit mission to negotiate with existing institutions, instead of collaborating with them. 
         In sum, Honghua is able to operate as an NGO working for protecting the rights of sex 
workers with absolute autonomy. Though nascent since 1997, Hong Kong’s civil society is 
vibrant and capable of shouldering accountabilities to check and challenge state power, at least 
compared with its mainland counterparts. Further benefitted from sufficient financial support 
from other civil society and societal actors and its deep social embeddedness with its 
constituencies, Honghua is able to develop a rights-based approach to its constituencies sex 
workers and represent their interests.  
By contrast, NGOs in mainland China, although working on the same agenda, cannot 
completely imitate Honghua’s rights advocacy approach. Though Honghua attempted to expand 
its services to sex workers in mainland China—it trained similar organizations in places such as 
Beijing, Shandong, Yunnan—their approaches are mostly service provision and remain relatively 
“discreet and inconspicuous” (Lim 2008). Owing to state repression on collective action and 
censorship on public debate, a traditional Tocquevillian civil society serving as a counter force to 
state power is absent in mainland China. As a result, NGOs operating in mainland China require 
symbolic legitimation granted by the state and its interactions with financial support and social 
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Located in Shenzhen—a southern city just seeing Hong Kong across a river—RSC has 
long been subject to state repression and struggled with obtaining symbolic legitimation to no 
avail. In early years, lacking in symbolic legitimation from the state provokes numerous 
repression from local authorities and RSC was forced to relocate many times. Though RSC 
secured basic legitimation by registering with a local MOCA, without close personal connections 
with any individual state agencies or agents RSC was yet again subject to state repression. The 
state repression further made RSC lose its core support from international NGOs and it was 
forced to grow dependent on local state funding to survive. As a result, this relegated the 
organization to community-oriented service provision. Accordingly, though RSC is aware of 
similar threats that their constituencies face as their Hong Kong counterparts, it is incapable of 
carrying out similar advocacy approach as Honghua does because its mission was diluted to 
catering to a broader population. 
In early years, RSC attempted to imitate Honghua’s rights advocacy approach but failed 
due to illegality of sex work in China and state repression on civil society. The history of RSC 
dates back to Beijing in 2006 when Jingmin, RSC’s current director, was introduced to one of the 
leaders of Honghua. Jingmin and her colleagues tried to imitate Honghua’s methods of legal aid 
to sex workers, but soon found these methods impractical in mainland China. In the runup to the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games, a central state crackdown on sex work debilitated RSC as it lost 
potential constituencies. National “strike-hard” campaigns (“yanda”) are not uncommon in 
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China especially right before important political events (Kaufman 2011).These crackdowns on 
sex work industry evicted sex workers out of Beijing thus RSC lost access to outreach to service 
targets, therefore lost its meaning to operate in Beijing. No longer a suitable place to operate 
against the local government, RSC relocated to Tianjin, a neighbor city of Beijing.  
Their outreach continued in Tianjin. There, RSC staff attempted to apply the methods 
they learned at Honghua: negotiating sex workers’ interactions with the police. However, a 
conflict with the Tianjin local police eventually made Jingmin and her colleagues targets of 
repression. After providing aid to a sex worker who was enmeshed in a troublesome affair with a 
local gang, RSC reported the situation to the police. However, the police sided with the gang, 
which collected “protection fees” from sex workers, due to its longstanding corrupt practice of 
receiving a portion of these fees. Instead, the police used the case to begin investigating RSC’s 
status, even confiscating RSC documents to bring charges against the NGO. 
Why did Honghua’s methods of direct police confrontation fail when implemented in 
Tianjin? First, before C&E was abolished, Chinese police shared a longstanding corrupt 
relationship with sex workers. Sex workers bribe the police either to obtain information about 
coming crackdowns or to avoid long-stretching custody in facilities.7 Advocating for sex 
workers’ rights and confronting with the police power thus undermine the police’s revenues. 
Second, local state methods of repression on civil society organizations, through soft tactics of 
interference and harassment, were frequently applied in Tianjin. Sex work, while tolerated in 
Hong Kong, is illegal in mainland China, and the police viewed RSC as a party abetting illegality 
rather than an organization advocating for legitimate sex workers’ rights.  
 
7 Since the C&E was no longer allowed in mainland China recently, sex workers didn’t need to 
bribe the police that much since the punishment of detention for 15 days is less severe compared 
to custody for at least 6 months. 
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After Jingmin and a colleague of hers suffered weeks of police harassment, they decided 
to shut down the organization in Tianjin. Both relocated to separate cities and continued the 
mission of RSC in their respective sites. Jingmin thus settled down in Shenzhen in 2011. In 
addition, after so many forced relocations, Jingmin was adamant to stop operating underground 
and formally register the NGO because lack in symbolic legitimation from the state provoked 
repression. She attempted to register the organization but registration hurdles were high at that 
time in Shenzhen. Jingmin did not have the 100,000 yuan required to register RSC with a district 
MOCA; registration with the city MOCA on the other hand was infeasible without an 
appropriate supervisory agency. Therefore, Jingmin’s organization remained underground until 
in 2015, when registration rules were relaxed. Jingmin managed to register with a district MOCA 
as an NGO serving migrant workers on its official claim. 
As RSC only registered with a local MOCA without constructing individual relationships 
with any specific state agencies, the symbolic legitimation was minute. As a result, even with a 
legitimate status, RSC was not free from repression by the police. In 2018 when I interned at 
RSC, it was once again forced to move its office from downtown to a suburb of Shenzhen. Two 
weeks before I started my internship, RSC was notified by the landlord that its lease was up, a 
decision which had been motivated by local police pressure. RSC’s former staff said that the 
police did not tell them specific reasons but they suspect that it was because of its services to sex 
workers. Later looking retrospectively in a meeting with interns, one of RSC’s former staff, 
Yumeng thought that the message conveyed was clearly soft repression. Although the moving 
cost was not substantially high, it could still be devastating for a small NGO like RSC. For fear 
of provoking even harder repression based on past experiences, RSC did not confront the police. 
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Instead, it packed up and moved into an office located in a rural residential neighborhood and 
expanded its service scope to community residents. 
The relocation this time transformed the RSC to a community-based organization that 
collaborates with local residents’ committees on government projects. The transformation 
seemed natural given the office’s proximity to a residential neighborhood. Interviews with RSC 
staff however, revealed that another reason for the transformation was state surveillance of 
international NGOs, which came in form of encouraging local governments purchase of NGOs’ 
services. Earlier in 2018, RSC lost its core funding from Oxfam, which had been a major sponsor 
of RSC, offering annual grants as large as 200,000 RMB and more. Oxfam’s funding was critical 
for RSC’s survival as the nature of core support funding rendered RSC more space to use the 
money at its discretion, contrasted by project-oriented funding that limits the ways of 
expenditure. RSC thus used Oxfam funding to cover institutional costs such as rents, personnel 
salaries. Losing its support was devastating to RSC’s survival, so it had to seek for alternative 
funding sources. 
The withdrawal of Oxfam funding to Chinese NGOs is an indirect result of the state 
repression on INGOs. Before Xi regime, domestic NGOs in China often receive funding from 
international NGOs (or INGOs) (Shieh and Brown-Inz 2013; Fulda 2013; Kang 2019), but a 
newly enacted law8 on regulating INGOs has dried up this funding source. Meanwhile, in a move 
to coopt now resource-starved NGOs, the Chinese state offered its own funding sources to 
Chinese NGOs through encouraging local governments to purchase their social services. 
 
8 In 2016 the National People’s Congress promulgated a law on managing INGOs in China (Li 
2019). The law stipulates that all INGOs in China to register with the Public Security Bureau 
before holding activities including funding domestic NGOs (Fu and Distelhorst 2018; Li 2019). 
Those fail to do so can be forced to stop working in China (Hsu and Teets 2016). 
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As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government encouraged local states to contract social 
services from NGOs after seeing their performances in the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. 
Municipalities allocate significant funds—for example, the Shenzhen government allocated 2 
million RMB per local residential neighborhood in 2018—which fund contracts with registered 
social organizations, corporations, and other enterprises to carry out social services in 
collaboration with residential neighborhoods. 9 The NGO contracting process is competitive, 
with district governments soliciting NGO project proposals and inviting “experts” to review and 
evaluate them. After losing Oxfam funding, RSC simply relied on government funding by 
collaborating with local residential communities. In the two years that RSC became majority 
government funded, the organization has delivered contracted services to full-time mothers, 
sanitation workers and children. In doing so, RSC’s political mission was diluted and its 
practices were no longer concentrated on delivering services to sex workers. Accordingly, RSC 
deploys a casual talk approach to outreach sex workers, rationalized by its staff as therapeutic, 
thus sidestepping more critical needs of their constituency that it is incapable of responding to.  
In sum, lack in symbolic legitimation from the local state incurred state repression, which 
jeopardized RSC’s financial autonomy. As a result, RSC had to resort to reliance on funding 
from the local state and collaboration with local residential neighborhoods to survive. RSC failed 
to carry out its political mission and transformed into a community-based NGO majorly offering 








Located in Tianjin—a city near to Beijing—HOL proactively sought for symbolic 
legitimation from the state from the outset. It secured state symbolic legitimation by registering 
at an early stage and building a rather stable and individualized affiliations with local state 
agencies. This shielded HOL from potential state repression. Compared with RSC which ended 
up having the local state as its sole funder, HOL maintained relative diverse sources of funding, 
offered by international and domestic foundations, local state and Center for Disease Control 
(CDC). Contrary to RSC, which was forced to obtain state affiliation caused by funding loss, 
HOL proactively rationalizes the symbolic legitimation as facilitating its social embeddedness 
among its constituency. Accordingly, HOL constructed and reinforced a sanitized discourse of 
sex workers, addressing their public health concerns and practicing stigma management of its 
constituencies, even though it was also aware that the crucial needs of sex workers lie in 
decriminalization.  
HOL was founded by four sex workers in 2008. One of them, a middle-tiered sex worker 
named Shulan, would later become HOL’s director. Shulan was inspired by voluntary activities 
she participated in at NGOs working on AIDS prevention and sought to expand peer education 
about AIDS prevention to sex workers as well. Shulan recalls that at first she was desperate 
turning to anybody for funding but as a rural woman with little education, she knew only 
complaining rather than appealing. Later in 2009, Shulan learned to write program proposals 
with the assistance of other activists and scholars and managed to solicit funding from 
international foundations. HOL began to take form as Shulan enriched her toolkit necessary for 
running a formal organization.  
Under Shulan’s leadership, HOL preferentially recruits sex workers to serve as NGO 
personnel, because Shulan believes it can raise their consciousness and empower themselves. In 
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the beginning, HOL thus operated as a bottom-up organization established by sex workers and 
for their own well-being. Accentuating its grassroots feature, Shulan comments that HOL is a 
“wild child” (ye haizi), contrasted by RSC which has Honghua as its teacher.  
As early as around 2012, HOL secured a legitimate status by registering with Bureau of 
Commerce and Industry, which is not uncommon among Chinese NGOs who feel registering 
with MOCA was too high a hurdle. Further, international private funding channels such as 
Oxfam and Ford Foundation enabled HOL to offer services to sex workers, without diluting its 
agenda by serving broader marginalized groups. Like RSC, in early years HOL focused 
exclusively on sex workers agenda, both by raising public awareness and policy advocacy 
approach. For instance, HOL produced a short movie based on the true story of a sex worker. 
Contrary to previous sex workers’ image depicted in popular media as innocent victims of 
trafficking or morally corrupt whores, the short movie depicted a sex worker who accidentally 
stepped into the sex industry due to economic hardship, but eventually came to enjoy the sexual 
pleasure brought by her work. The movie was nominated for a prize in Cannes Film Festival. 
In addition, HOL pursued policy advocacy, rather than intervening at the community 
level or acting as a legal advocate. A prime example of this approach is HOL’s work on 
abolishing the custody and education system (C&E) (“shourong jiaoyu”), a central state policy 
mentioned earlier which exploited labor of sex workers when they were put in long-term custody 
in the facilities. By collaborating with Asia Catalyst, a think tank, on writing a report on the 
issue,10 and helping to gather signatures from 108 experts, activists and politicians, HOL aided in 
persuading an NPC standing committee member11 to propose the abolishment during its annual 
 
10 Details about this report can be found https://asiacatalyst.org/blog/tag/custody-and-education/. 
11 NPC (National People’s Congress) Standing Committee is China’s legislative body.  
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meeting. Activists began to take move after a similar system “Reeducation through Labor” 
(“laodong gaizao”) was abolished in 2013. Even though a small move, it was effective as in this 
year the abolishment was officially approved, reported by Chinese media as progress toward 
lawful governance.12 
To gain a more legitimate appearance (baozhuang) in the eyes of the state, HOL decided 
to register with a local MOCA and with a district level Women’s Federation (WF)13 as its 
supervisory agency in 2015. It began to implement government projects in 2017. Unlike RSC, 
which registered with local district MOCA only after it was forced to relocate, HOL proactively 
sought for the formal affiliation. Since serving sex workers will not be a legitimate cause for a 
registered NGO, HOL expanded its official service scope to migrant women in general. HOL 
concealed the true service targets, sex workers from WF and reported to it as an NGO concerned 
with the well-being of migrant women. When I was in the field, HOL was implementing a 
project it contracted with MOCA about improving life quality of migrant population in Tianjin. 
As part of many of its activities, HOL designed a one-day workshop that helps to improve the 
relationships between migrant workers and their children.  
Unlike RSC, which lost its financial support due to state’s intervention on INGOs and 
relies on state legitimation to obtain financial support, HOL does not rely on government 
projects for obtaining financial resources. On the contrary, the director Shulan complained that 
HOL loses money doing government projects to the extent that “they are exploiting” it. The 
 
12 http://www.bjnews.com.cn/opinion/2020/04/03/712566.html 
13 The national level All-China Women’s Federation is one of a few state-authorized mass 
organizations which acted as bridges between the CCP and the people. Most WF personnel are 
party cadres (Simon 2013). Other mass organizations include All-China Federation of Trade 




administrative process in implementing government projects is more strenuous than other 
projects funded by international or Chinese foundations. Specifically, the administrative 
paperwork that social organizations are required to submit is meticulous, sometimes to an absurd 
extent. HOL staff must be more careful with government projects because a spurious number on 
its accounting records might provoke further distrust and repression. State guidelines for 
reimbursements were equally byzantine, in ways that left NGOs with little space for using 
government funding to cover their actual operating costs.  
Instead, symbolic legitimation helps HOL to either conceal or sanitize stigma associated 
with sex work thus enhances its legitimacy both in the eyes of the state and its constituencies. 
Symbolic legitimation enabled by government affiliation first lends HOL more legitimacy by 
shielding it from potential state inspection. As Shulan herself notes, HOL signed a service 
provision contract with local MOCA to make its existence more “rational”. This legitimacy 
became particularly valuable to HOL when the NGO encountered troubles with the local police. 
For example, two months before I came to intern, HOL was experiencing a hard time due 
to an ongoing anti-corruption campaign (saohei chu’e), which largely limited activities of sex 
industry as the police cracked down on sex workers in Tianjin. During this period, a sex worker 
knowing HOL was arrested, and disclosed to the police a narrative that HOL had been gathering 
sex workers together and to teach them anti-government laws. As a result, Shulan was “invited” 
to the police station and questioned by them. During her police visit, Shulan showed the 
aforementioned contract HOL signed with the city MOCA to the police. To account for the 
charge of gathering sex workers for mobilization, Shulan showed the police the contents of the 
project written in their contract with MOCA, which included offering legal and health lectures to 
migrant population. Since this accounted for the gathering, and the police did not possess other 
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evidence of anti-government actions, Shulan was set free. Without the contract, HOL would not 
be able to get around with the police. 
Furthermore, HOL rationalizes the state legitimation as a way to facilitate its social 
embeddedness among sex workers: addressing their health concerns and managing a sanitized 
image of sex workers. Symbolic legitimation enables HOL to collaborate with CDC projects. 
The rather countable and profitable practices of STIs checks seemingly magnify HOL’s efficacy, 
thus further justify its existence. In addition, HOL staff believe that the symbolic legitimation 
enhances its social embeddedness as sex workers trust organizations with more affiliation with 
the government. As a result, HOL reconfigures the discourse of sex workers and address their 
needs simply as ordinary migrant women. Accordingly, it tailored its approaches to sex workers, 
managing their image to match the discourse and increasing mutual interactions between sex 
workers and the public. This at once draws sex workers closer to the public view and deepens 
public understanding of a relatively just image of sex workers as hustling family care-takers. I 
will unpack these consequences in the following section.  
To sum up, while Honghua serves as an ideal type of civil society organization that 
possesses both financial support and social embeddedness, exemption from a requirement of 
state symbolic legitimation is equally important to its political capacity to carry out rights 
advocacy mission. By contrast, though RSC had certain level of social embeddedness and 
financial support before it was repressed, a necessity of gaining symbolic legitimation intervenes 
with its financial autonomy. This diminished political capacity of RSC as it was drawn further 
away from its original rights advocacy approach owing to diluted service targets. Finally, 
through building more intimate relations with local state agencies, HOL was able to obtain more 
symbolic legitimation from the state than RSC. While lending HOL more legitimacy, the 
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symbolic legitimation however, is used to enhance its social embeddedness with its 
constituencies. This in turn reconfigures the discourse of sex workers, thus influencing its 
political capacities by deviating from policy advocacy toward depoliticized public health 
initiatives and self-sanitizing image management.  
 
VARIATION IN POLITICAL CAPACITIES 
Standing Up to the State, Protecting Basic Rights 
As mentioned earlier, Honghua does not require symbolic legitimation from the state; 
quite the opposite, it challenges the local state’s authority that violates legal rights of sex 
workers. By intervening directly between police and sex workers, Honghua functions as a legal 
advocate for its constituencies. Before jumping to detailed strategies of Honghua deploys to 
protect their rights, I will first introduce background of sex industry in Hong Kong. 
There are various forms of sex work in Hong Kong, including sex workers operating one 
woman brothels (yeit lao yeit fong), Karaoke hostesses, and street walkers, depending on types of 
services provided, their workplace and revenues.14 Sex workers in Hong Kong come from a more 
diverse background than their counterparts in mainland China. They are Hong Kong citizens, 
mainland Chinese, and foreign migrants typically from Asian countries such as Philippines and 
Thai. The client profile has more diverse backgrounds as well. Clients to one-woman brothels are 
in various ages and occupations. Most of the local Hong Kong sex workers are commonly found 
in one-woman brothels, which are small apartments where independent sex workers operate. Sex 





thematic setting and basic living essential furniture. During worktime, sex workers dressed in 
their outfits and wait for clients to come. In an apartment building where many sex workers hold 
their brothels, clients can wander around and shop the entire building, knocking on their doors, 
checking out sex workers and asking prices. 
As in other regions, the public discourse on sex work is stigmatized as “dirty” and 
immoral (Wong et al 2011). Such typical public discourse on sex work pushed sex workers into a 
more vulnerable space. For instance, the police could act as clients and solicit sex worker into 
doing illegal behaviors before they can arrest them. Or they ask sex workers to perform free sex 
with them, threatening with detention if disobeying their order (Yan and Yao 2012). Clients on 
the other hand can rape sex workers, verbally abuse them, refuse to pay after service, and take 
their photos and videos while having sex with them.  
Comparing itself to the wild grass that is able to survive in adverse circumstances, 
Honghua helps sex workers to fight against these abuse and harassment by providing them with 
legal aids and protection from the violence. Their approaches are roughly three-fold: protecting 
rights of sex workers through challenging laws and policies that are not in favor of sex workers, 
fighting for more political opportunities through lobbying politicians and attending rallies, and 
raising public awareness about sex workers through training volunteers (Yan and Yao 2012).  
Fighting a war  
Operating as a legal advocate, Honghua’s framing revolves around “fighting a war” (Yan 
and Yao 2012). According to one of its leaders, the biggest challenge for sex workers is power 
abuse of the police and restrictions of the law. What Honghua is fighting against, thus is majorly 
the law “that is supposed to protect sex workers, instead of currently misused to exploit them” 
(Yan and Yao 2012).  
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Accordingly, in early years Honghua mobilizes sex workers to “sue” the police when 
their rights are violated. However it was not as easy as filing a lawsuit against labor disputes 
owing to ambiguous legislative regulations on sex workers and public discrimination against sex 
work. To fight for more political space to ensure the basic rights of sex workers, Honghua 
actively participates in politics through either lobbying politicians or going on the street for 
rallies and marches. Since candidates used to crack down on sex work to win for more support, 
sex workers in Hong Kong oftentimes faced with more oppressions during election seasons. 
Honghua for instance, challenged such politicians by openly condemning them on a newspaper. 
It eventually collected signatures filling in over half of one page of the paper (Yan and Yao 
2012). They also went on marches to protest a party against its self-contradictory and 
discriminating discourses on sex workers. Through years of lobbying, Honghua claims that there 
are several senators willing to openly support sex workers (Yan and Yao 2012).  
Over years, Honghua also actively participated in many protests and social movements, 
mostly collectively with other labor rights organizations (Yan and Yao 2012). For instance, they 
attended March on July 1st—a traditional march in Hong Kong protesting on civil human 
rights—and went on march on Labor Day. They raised up high mottos such as “sex work is 
work” and “decriminalize sex work.” Large scale protests in Hong Kong are regular and in most 
of the times take place in order. Organizations with various political interests often seize these 
opportunities to advocate for changes. Given the vibrant political environment and autonomy of 
Hong Kong political system, Honghua was able to join with other organizations and advocate 
rights for sex workers in those occasions. 
In Honghua’s rationale then, rather than obtaining symbolic legitimation from the local 
state, the legitimacy of which is at stake and the authority of it is viable to be challenged. 
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Through at least 10 years of efforts, Honghua helped to largely mitigate the police harassment 
and they grew more willing to deal with reports of sex workers about ill-behaved clients. As its 
founder claims that “at least now the police are willing to sit down and talk to all the yeit lou yeit 
fong in Hong Kong every three months” (Yan and Yao 2012). Honghua thus believes that it 
would decriminalize sex work in Hong Kong eventually, through efforts of continuing this war.  
Legal counselling 
Accordingly, the major tactic of Honghua’s outreach is legal counselling. Its outreach 
thus involves little or no casual talk. Honghua staff focus on disseminating legal knowledge to 
new sex workers and collecting their complaints about police abuse and clients harassment. A 
typical Honghua site visit involves its staff touring the entire building where sex workers operate 
their one-woman brothels. Staff members or volunteers of Honghua knock on each of their 
doors, introduce the organization and its mission, and ask if they know about their basic rights as 
sex workers in Hong Kong. In each issue of their newsletters, Honghua reports how many 
complaints about abuse and harassment from the police and the clients were collected since the 
last issue to raise awareness of sex workers.  
During my first outreach activity with Honghua, I was surprised by this straightforward 
approach. I had been trained by RSC to stay as long as possible in their brothels and engage in 
small talk in order to establish rapport with sex workers. On one occasion, I stayed in a sex 
worker’s brothel, developing a long conversation with the sex worker, only to be interrupted by a 
long-term volunteer knocking on the door and reminding me that we should go. When we were 
out in the hallway, she told me that we are not supposed to be in there for more than 15 minutes 
because our presence would disrupt their business. “If sex workers want small talk,” another 
Honghua staff told me, “they can always go to see therapists. Or just church will do.” 
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In addition, Honghua offers strategic advice to sex workers to solve these abuses and 
concerns. For instance, a full-time staff Gin described how they helped to deal with misbehaving 
clients (“suike”) taking secret sex photos of sex workers. A sex worker reported to Honghua 
about a client taking pictures of her while having sex, and threatened her to post them on social 
media. Honghua helped to identify the client and posted his pictures all over the walls of the 
apartment building where the sex worker worked, thus both revealed his face and reminded other 
sex workers that he is a suike. Honghua also wrote in its newsletters about similar event that sex 
workers reported their sex videos taken by “candid cameras” being uploaded on popular 
websites. Honghua contacted the uploader of the video and successfully asked him to remove it. 
Honghua also accompanies sex workers with charges going on court and make sure that their 
legal rights are respected.  
To raise the public awareness about sex workers to make them more visible and less 
stigmatized, Honghua also publishes on sex work related topics and train volunteers. Its staff 
members collaborate with scholars and activists doing research on sex workers and publish 
relevant findings. They follow up new policies related to sex workers in other countries around 
the world. They also collect and publish violent incidents on sex workers reported in the news, in 
most of the cases, murder of sex workers. In addition, they regularly train volunteers from the 
society and organize lectures by sex workers in universities to increase mutual communication 
(Yan and Yao 2012).  
As a result, Honghua is able to represent interests of its constituencies sex workers and 
confront the authorities to push the boundaries between the legal and the illicit. Starting as 
collective activism, Honghua is able to carry out its missions without deflections and maintain 
autonomy without cooptation or rarely with repression by the state. By contrast, its counterpart in 
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the neighbor city Shenzhen—though only several miles away—is limited to deploy depoliticized 
strategy in lieu of rights advocacy. While Honghua is allowed to push boundaries, RSC is faced 
with a more constraining environment, thus can only resort to a casual talk tactic in its outreach, 
backed up by a therapeutic rationale.  
 
Sidestepping Repression, Offering Camaraderie 
  
In the suburb of Shenzhen where RSC operates, NGO work is depoliticized and 
transformed into community service. RSC’s premises have thus become a space of solidarity 
where staff offer therapeutic services to sex workers. 
Shenzhen is home to a vibrant sex industry like other major cities in China. Shenzhen, 
one of the earliest special economic zones assigned by former premier leader Deng Xiaoping, 
has a relaxed tax regime and financial policies that are conducive to business development. 
Because of this, the local job market is more vibrant in Shenzhen compared with other Chinese 
cities. In addition, due to its proximity to Hong Kong, the city has frequent cross-border 
transactions and foreign investment business deals. On the other end of the economic spectrum, 
this vibrant economic activity also attracts migrant labor from inland, rural provinces. 
The sex industry in Shenzhen is highly stratified, ranging from high end sex workers catering to 
Hong Kong businessmen working in starred hotels to street walkers living in less privileged 
rented apartments in city villages.15 RSC serves low-end sex workers who either open their 
brothels disguised as massage parlors or barber shops, or solicit on the street. They gather mostly 
in city villages of Shenzhen. The client profile accordingly is multi-tiered. Businessmen from 
 
15 City villages (“cheng zhong cun”) are used-to-be rural villages transformed into local resident 
neighborhoods. They mostly located in periphery districts of Shenzhen so rent is lower. 
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Hong Kong go to nearby brothels where sex is sold cheaper than in Hong Kong. Sex workers 
working in rural city villages cater to clients who are either residents in the same village or 
migrant workers working nearby. 
Like their counterparts in Hong Kong, sex workers in Shenzhen face constant threats of 
arrest and crackdowns in addition to more severe threats, given the illegality of sex work in 
mainland Chinese criminal laws. Illegality and stigma oftentimes discourage sex workers from 
seeking help to outside sources. They also refrain from consulting medical professionals in 
hospitals for fear of their identity exposed. They do not report violence at the hands of clients to 
the police. Client violence include but are not restricted to robbery, rape, free sex, smash their 
furniture, and murder. 
Before it came to Shenzhen, RSC attempted to imitate strategies of Honghua by 
negotiating between the police and sex workers as mentioned in the last section. However, 
RSC’s courageous attempt to confront the police power in Tianjin brought itself repression. 
Jingmin, the director of RSC, learnt from years of failure to attempting rights advocacy approach 
that the illegal nature of “sex industry doesn’t allow social workers to obtain any sense of 
accomplishments, let alone talking about rights protection.” The relocation to suburb Shenzhen 
further further urged RSC to transform into a service provider organization that expanded its 
service scope to the general public oriented by its projects funding. Obtaining symbolic 
legitimation from the state rendered RSC little space to represent the interests of their original 
constituent sex workers as its practices were diluted to satisfy needs of other groups. 
Accordingly, in lieu of rights advocacy that its teacher Honghua deploys, RSC resorts to a casual 
talk approach to its original constituent sex workers and rationalizes it as a way to meet the 




To resolve the contradiction between its original mission and its inability to perseverance 
to the rights advocacy approach, RSC thus resorts to therapeutic framing both to rationalize the 
needs of sex workers and the objectives of their outreach. As such, both outreach and service 
provision of RSC have a therapeutic feel. RSC staff members mostly sidestep the political 
repression that pushed sex workers into vulnerable state, believing that there was nothing they 
can do about it, even though years before its formal registration RSC at least was concerned with 
rights advocacy for sex workers. Hence, the real needs of sex workers are either obscured or 
considered non-existent in the beginning.  
As the director Jingmin reflected the failed attempt in Tianjin for instance, without 
further discussing the consequence brought by state repression, she jumped to conclusion that “as 
social workers taking the company of these sisters, we can only seek comfort from the services 
we provide with them.” Similarly, asked to explain the reason of the change, a former staff 
Yumeng sidestepped deeper issues of illegality, and instead offered a breezy description of 
camaraderie: “living in a big city alone, you need someone to give you some support and 
reliance. People can get lonely in Shenzhen.” 
RSC staff believe that it exists for sex workers as both an outlet of their emotions for 
therapeutic reasons and a social circle for solidarity reasons, which are evident in both former 
staff Sichun and Yumeng’s account. Sichun interprets their outreach strategies as therapeutic. 
To tell the truth, some sisters, they don’t need you to do anything for them. What they 
need is company, outlet for their talks. During these discussions you would insert your 




Similarly Yumeng described that RSC’s existence to sex workers is like a “tree hole,” a 
metaphor that stands for a safe place where people take their secrets off the chest without others’ 
knowledge: 
I think our existence to them, is like telling them that the society still accepts you. 
Acceptance and respect. Or our existence is like a tree hole. You can talk and I can listen. 
I will understand you, and give you some help. Other than that, I tell the truth, they don’t 
need our help. 
  
Staff of RSC thus believe that sex workers do not need any help that they could offer. Its 
function thus stop at being a tree hole where sex workers can dump their negative emotions. The 
mission to fight against violence to sex workers and negotiate more rights for sex workers was 
gradually gone with the wind. The mission of RSC thus transformed into “build trust and 
solidarity among them.” Accordingly, RSC deploys casual talks as its major tactics in outreach.  
Casual talks 
In its outreach, RSC neither collects complaints from sex workers nor raises awareness 
about abuse and harassment of the police or clients. Instead, staff members rely on casual talk 
with sex workers to collect information about what happened in their lives. Three times a week 
they visit city villages where brothels gather, preparing for sitting in each parlor for at least half 
an hour and chatting with sex workers either familiar with or new to RSC. A typical outreach 
usually starts with a greeting from the RSC staff, asking them how they are doing and how 
business is recently. RSC staff then find related topics to chat, ranging from news they are 
checking on their phones, clothes they wear, where they go shopping, their marriage, their 
children, their relationships with the clients. 
Every time we returned from the outreach, the first thing in the next morning is to write 
outreach records, reminding ourselves what we chatted in the last outreach. Each sex worker has 
her own archive of chatting history and RSC kept track of what was going on in their lives as if 
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preparing for writing up a biography for each one of the sex workers. Their archives are then 
grouped together by brothels if they work in the same one, by village and by district. RSC staff 
and interns instructed by them, take pride in staying long in the brothels and writing long 
outreach records. For instance, the first time I participated in a site visit with Sichun, a former 
staff member of RSC, we wandered and sat in about 5 brothels in one village for about three 
hours. When asked to describe a successful site visit, Sichun recollected: 
I remember one time I talked for the longest time. I went there [a brothel] at round 3 and 
chatted with them [sex workers] until 6 to 7. It was about 3 to 5 hours of talking. I 
remember I wrote the outreach records for many pages. All the pages were written by me. 
That time was when they were not in a good mood. So they wanted to talk. 
  
While experienced staff members set the standard as the longer chat the better, interns who 
cannot find the right topic to talk with sex workers felt the situation was awkward. Interns of 
RSC are typically college students majoring in social work and are required to do internship to 
graduate. Outreach undertaken by interns alone without a staff’s presence usually ended early. 
They talked about how the chat was not going well and reflected to improve. 
RSC staff explain the purpose of the long casual talks are both for building up 
relationships with sex workers and for collection reasons. Sichun talked about how she managed 
to transform passive sex workers to active participants in RSC’s activities by building up 
relationships with her. 
Like sister Jiang from A district … To tell the truth I’m not good at remembering 
people’s face. But after our talk that time I was able to remember her. I forget how I got 
into this topic, but we mainly talked about her kid, who just went to college…At first 
sister Jiang didn’t agree [to participate in RSC’s activities]. But I tried the second and the 
third time. We can do it nice and slow. So later when we were there doing regular three 
diseases rapid checks, she was enthusiastic. She even asked others to participate. I think 
that was progress. 
  
Sichun reflected that when she resigned from RSC, she felt proud of being able to build 
connections with 20 to 30 sex workers. She built rapport with a brothel of sex workers in A 
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district and introduced them to RSC and its activities all from scratch. She thinks that “it was 
quite something.”  
In addition, stories collected during outreach visits are said to be potential materials for 
publicizing use. For instance, another staff Yumeng argues that sex workers’ life stories can be 
accumulated and made into “promotion” for the organization or a “compilation” for the 
individual sex worker. RSC also regularly post life stories of sex workers on its official Wechat 
account, an online platform where registered user accounts can publish articles to its followers. 
Whether these articles were read by a broad audience or helped in any ways to change the 
discriminating public discourse about sex workers however, is left unaddressed.  
 According to RSC staff, relationships built during outreach thus can promote future 
service provision. RSC’s services are twofold, health and leisure. Health related services include 
free rapid tests for syphilis, AIDS and hepatitis B. They also instruct sex workers on how and 
where they can go to standardized hospitals for STIs, without disclosing their occupation. RSC 
also holds gatherings and activities on special occasions such as traditional Chinese festivals, as 
well as beauty related lessons on doing nails, hair, and makeup. 
In addition to regular site visits and activities designed for leisure purposes, RSC offers 
material and social support to sex workers in detention. Both of the former employees I 
interviewed went to visit a sex worker in detention. They brought about 500 to 1000 yuan to the 
sex worker and some life essentials such as bed sheets and comforter to her. But they stopped 
short of offering legal advice or addressing the conditions of her detention. 
Without their critical needs being addressed and knowing that RSC was not capable of 
helping them in legal terms, sex workers are not as enthusiastic to attending the activities held by 
RSC. When I was accompanying one of the college student interns to a group activity she 
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designed, we basically sat through the one hour activity, watching a group of sex workers talking 
to each other instead of to us. During outreach, sex workers did report to RSC staff whether 
recent police crackdowns were severe or not, but they do not expect that RSC staff, referred by 
them as “little girls” to help them with such grievances. Though RSC interns and staff talked 
about crackdowns are unfair and exploitative for sex workers, they choose to sidestep the 
political issue and rationalize their therapeutic approaches as the only means to help them.  
 
Utilizing State Legitimation, Sanitizing Stigma  
Although both RSC and HOL expanded their service scope to a broader population, RSC 
was forced to implement government projects while HOL proactively sought for collaboration 
opportunities. Like RSC, since government affiliation, HOL drifted away from rights advocacy 
approach to sex workers. Unlike RSC that admits its inefficacy when it dilutes the agenda with 
other service targets, HOL on the other hand carries out the public health needs for the state and 
uses the legitimacy to manage a sanitized image of sex workers.  
The sex industry in Tianjin is similar to that of Shenzhen. The industry is tiered and most 
of the women that HOL serves are also lower-tier sex workers. They are in their 40s to 50s, 
frequently formerly married with children, now divorced or separated. The modal Tianjin sex 
worker is a rural woman migrant who serves local older men or migrant workers. Sex workers 
work in brothels which also double as massage parlors or barbershops. Many sex workers are 
rural women who used to work in brothels in villages on the outskirts of Tianjin, where village 
demolitions due to rapid urbanization have forced them to relocate to residential neighborhoods 
all over the city. They typically rent a small apartment on the first or second level of the 
residential apartments so that it is convenient for the clients to come.  
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While HOL attempted to fulfill its old mission to fight for more spaces for Chinese sex workers, 
its efficacy was minimal. The organization expended most of its resources obtaining legitimacy 
and conjuring up a legitimate image of sex worker. What HOL offered to its sex workers, then, 
was reduced to health services provision and image management.  
Profiting off public health initiatives  
To maintain and match with its legitimate status, HOL relies on devoting to health 
initiatives even though it contradicts with its mission to combat against the real threats facing its 
constituencies. The direct transaction between tubes of blood tested in exchange of a portion of 
its funding is deemed to be more feasible and legitimate than policy advocacy. HOL rationalizes 
the focus on providing health related services as a way to improve the well-being of sex workers.  
In partnership with the district CDC, HOL conducts surveys and tests on STIs and AIDS 
among sex workers and their male clients.16 Unlike RSC, which devotes only a small portion of 
its total budget to CDC projects,17 HOL devoted nearly 50,000 RMB to collaborative projects 
with the CDC. Although HOL staff acknowledge that health concerns are not by far the most 
critical needs of their constituency sex workers, they perceive it as a more legitimate cause of its 
existence than policy advocacy. 
HOL staff were aware that rather than STIs, the more significant threat to sex workers’ 
well-being were police crackdowns. For example, a full-time staff Mudan explained that 
legalization of sex work can help reduce the risks of diseases. 
 [Now] sex workers have to let the clients [to finish and] get out of the room as soon as 
possible, minimizing the risks [of being caught]. Sometimes it’s not like the clients don’t 
 
16 There are two types of tests, the one using simple test sticks and the one that involves blood 
sample lab tests. Both tests come along with questionnaires to either sex workers or clients. They 
surveyed the sexual behaviors of test takers and their knowledge about AIDS. 
17 RSC only devotes on average 10,000 yuan per year of its funding to CDC projects, which was 
funded by CDC. 
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want to wear condoms. It’s the sex workers don’t want them to, in order to let them finish 
quickly. So she would just do it with him without condom. So that’s why it’s so easily 
transmitted. If you only spent two or three minutes in the room, it’s hard to get caught on 
site. Especially now when they are not caught on site, then the police can’t really say 
anything if they don’t admit it. 
  
As Mudan argues, the prevalence of STIs among sex workers is a result of the criminalization of 
sex work. She also argues that the decriminalization of sex work would encourage more 
widespread condom usage which would prevent STI infection. 
If it’s legalized, then there is not going to be so much disease. Legalization would let 
people wear condoms more. If you really legalize it, then she would think like, well it’s 
okay to take it slow, as long as he wears condom. She would not be afraid of the police 
arresting them. It’s for their own safety. 
   
In Mudan’s view, decriminalization is the ultimate public health measure. However, similar as 
abolishing C&E, she contends that “a righteous act doesn’t mean that it’s correct” implying that 
further policy advocacy would provoke severe repression, whereas “health is what can be done 
right now.”  
Similarly, the director Shulan also acknowledged that police crackdowns were more 
threatening to sex workers than AIDS and other STIs. Because “current polices forced [sex 
workers] to shut down” their brothels, sex workers were subject to various kinds of violence. 
Further, Shulan admits that over-emphasizing association between sex workers and STIs will 
magnify existing stigma of sex workers that labelled them as dirty. Yet even with these two 
rationales, HOL continues to carry out public health services because Shulan argued that without 
AIDS, HOL “doesn’t have an excuse to exist.” After all, “it’s all about legality in China to 
operate NGOs.”  
As a result, HOL attempts to craft its outreach and activities to address health care needs 
of sex workers. HOL performs outreach more sporadically than RSC. Its staff go on site visits 
only when needed, usually to solicit more sex workers to participate in STIs and AIDS tests 
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which the organization implements along with a local district CDC. Returning from the outreach, 
HOL staff do not write down in details new stories they knew from chatting with sex workers 
(though they also talk with sex workers); instead they record how many new sex workers were 
outreached, how many agreed to join in its Wechat group, and importantly how many consented 
to take the STI tests.   
Though Shulan claims that collaboration with CDC is more for the purpose of legitimacy, 
HOL substantially profits from CDC projects. Because HOL drew a portion of its operating 
budget from conducting surveys and public health tests, more sex workers recruited meant more 
tests and surveys completed, and a higher funding received from each quota completed. For each 
person tested and surveyed, HOL can receive 150 to 200 yuan from CDC. Most of this funding 
goes to cover Mudan’s salary and other subsidies for HOL’s volunteers. The CDC ran its 
projects on an excessively tight timeline, leaving HOL in haste scrambling to meet unrealistic 
quotas for recruiting sex workers for participation in its studies. On one instance, Mudan and I 
commuted for two hours to reach a distant neighborhood where HOL outreach had yet to 
penetrate, in order to obtain “new blood.” After a quick introduction and rapport-building, we 
proceeded to market CDC health services by asking sex workers if they needed free syphilis and 
AIDS tests. Shulan sometimes brought with her a brochure full of fearsome pictures of sexually 
transmitted diseases, then offered free tests to the women terrified by the pictures. As a result, 
even the health initiatives were reduced to accomplishing quotas for the local state agencies, 
rather than educating peer sex workers on how to prevent STIs or AIDS.  
Managing a sanitized image of sex workers  
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HOL further uses the symbolic legitimation from the state to enhance its social 
embeddedness as it believes that the legitimation coming from the state translates to legitimacy 
in the eyes of its constituencies. In an interview, the director Shulan explains: 
For example, we used to find that when sisters came to our office, they didn’t want to. 
Because what we said to the public was we only provide services to sex workers. They 
would think that ‘I don’t want to go to your organization because if I go there it would 
prove that I’m a sex worker.’ So they were given a label. If we detach them from this 
label, we would treat her as a human being. She thinks that under that working 
circumstance, she has one identity [as a sex worker]. But out of that circumstance, she is 
just an ordinary person, an ordinary woman. She is an ordinary migrant woman. And we 
are just an organization that provides services to migrant women. We came to know her 
as a person, but not her identity. That way, she would feel lighter about our services and 
wouldn’t think that she is labelled. 
  
[With formal registration and affiliating with the state] our agenda can be broader, less 
limited. … Let them know that they can bath in sunshine, not just staying in the dark 
corner. Let them know that HOL can also be exposed in light as well. It’s very important 
to them. 
 
Shulan believes that in the eyes of sex workers, registration with MOCA and the proof of 
legitimacy hung on its wall—the awards that HOL won as outstanding NGO given by the 
governments—are a sign of “authority” and “sunshine.” Ironically though sex workers abhor the 
police and their crackdowns, they otherwise “trust authorities” in Shulan’s view. 
As a result, HOL treats sex workers as ordinary migrant women, corresponding with its 
official service targets. Accordingly, in conversations with other sex workers, HOL staff rely on 
topics to remind them of their role as ordinary women such as mothers, daughters, or wives. In 
their discourse, sex work is not a voluntary profession, but rather a compulsory condition that 
women undertake only in order to fulfil familial responsibilities to parents or children.  
During an informal meeting among HOL staff and their long-term volunteers for 
instance, the topic soon tilted to their filial duties. Mudan shared her experience of failing to take 
care of her father who had Alzheimer back in her hometown. She felt guilty of leaving him there 
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for working in Tianjin but she had to because her children rely on her remittance. After hearing 
about Mudan’s story, Lan, a sex worker volunteer for HOL, spoke up: “I knew that being in this 
business could harm our bodies, but what else can I do?” Lan shared that her mother was in 
depression, her children were in college, and her husband had lung cancer. She performed sex 
work because she was the sole capable breadwinner. 
During outreach, HOL staff also advised sex workers to align with an image of sex 
workers focusing on earning money to support their families. In some occasions for instance, 
Shulan taught sex workers to save their money for later use instead of spending it on themselves 
for leisure. One sex worker, Lu, worked in a rural neighborhood in her own brothel. Lu loved 
shopping and she admitted that she is a “shopping maniac.” She showed us two full wardrobes of 
clothes that she bought online. She also signed herself up for online calligraphy and painting 
lessons and proudly showed us the paintings of hers hung on the wall. Seeing that Shulan said to 
her that she shouldn’t buy so many clothes because it was not easy for them to earn money and 
she should save it for late life. On the way back Shulan confessed that she thought that Lu should 
start saving more money, since her parents need care, Lu is divorced and her daughter is not that 
close with her. The instructions also expand on managing relationships with their clients to 
insure wealth for themselves. For instance, Shulan advised a sex worker Zhang to take good care 
of a long-term client of hers, so she could ask him to buy her an apartment in Tianjin. Zhang 
followed her advice and the episode of hers was told to other sex workers as an ideal example of 
exit of sex industry. As Mudan told me in the interview that the ultimate mission of HOL right 
now, is to let sex workers earn more money, making ends meet, and “send them back to their 
loved ones at home.” 
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An appropriate image of sex workers with wise options managing their money in turn 
rules out other possibilities of entering sex industry and draws boundaries with unwise ways to 
extravagant spending. For instance, a new outreached sex worker Xie expressed explicitly to us 
that no one wants to do it unless they have nothing else to do. She further continued that “for us 
old guys, we don’t have too many years left for the job, but I would feel ashamed for young girls 
entering the industry.” Mudan agreed to her words. As Shulan sums it up, people might think 
that sex work is an easy thing to do, “but actually a lot of people can’t even do this well; they 
either use the money to gamble, ended up with bad guys, or spent the money very soon.” 
Since the symbolic legitimation is used to enhance its social embeddedness—namely 
helping HOL to gain more legitimacy in the eyes of its constituencies—HOL tailored the image 
of “just” sex workers to match with the legitimation. As a result, to HOL, the discourse of sex 
workers transformed from a rural woman boldly pursuing her own destiny and ended up 
enjoying the pleasure of sex work—as depicted in its early Cannes Festival nominated short 
movie—to one ordinary migrant woman compelled into the sex industry under the economic 
pressure to take care of her family.  
To further reinforce the sanitized image of sex workers as migrant women, HOL 
encourages sex workers to interact more with the public. The director Shulan for instance invites 
sex workers volunteers to participate in non-sex-worker activities, specifically HOL’s side 
projects on migrant population. Previous activities they held for government projects pictured 
familiar faces of sex workers volunteers. Shulan explained it as 
Migrant women can have interactions with these sex workers. We would let sex workers 
volunteer for other public welfare activities, let them have these training opportunities. 




Volunteers and sex workers practiced the interactions positively and the effects were said 
to be substantial. Lan for instance, a long-term sex worker volunteer of HOL expressed in an 
internal meeting that she felt rewarding about the efforts she made in soliciting funding for a 
project of HOL dedicated to migrant workers on a crowd funding platform. In another meeting, 
sex workers talked about how they changed people’s impression of sex workers by getting to 
know them in person. Xue’s brothel was frowned upon when she first opened the place in her 
neighborhood. However, later she seized a chance to talk to her neighbor and managed to let the 
neighbor know her as a person, not a sex worker per se. Through working for HOL and knowing 
sex workers in person, a long-term volunteer who is not a sex worker Ying, internalized the 
reconfigured legit image of sex workers as she once commented that “all sisters have a high self-
esteem so that is why they want to make a living to take care of their families.”  
This is supposed to be a softened approach that help sex workers “enter the public view” 
according to the director Shulan. However, the softened approach is contrasted by its original 
sharpened advocacy approach, which is thus considered not as appropriate. The whole tactic is 
built upon the assumption that only through sanitizing into ordinary migrant women can sex 
workers enter the public view. As Shulan explains it in an interview,  
It’s not about accomplishing larger projects. But to make more people, more common 
people to understand your agenda. You can’t let your agenda stay in ivory tower forever, 
that only a small group of people can understand what you are saying and doing. …If you 
keep exacerbating the problem, few people will accept it. If you soften it on the other 
hand [it is easier to be accepted]…In the future if you really want to do public welfare in 
China, or if you want to advocate for some changes, the things you do should be able to 
enter public view. If you want to enter people’s view, letting more people see the 
problem, know the problem can trigger changes. 
 
As HOL gained more symbolic legitimation from the state, it devoted more to maintain 
the legitimate status, to the extent to self-censoring the image of sanitized sex workers. While 
there is some truth in the rationalization that viewing sex workers as migrant women facilitates 
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public acknowledgement of sex workers as individual people, the assumption that sex workers 
are stigmatized as they are left the origin of such stigmatization unquestioned. In so doing, a 
blurred boundary between sex workers and migrant women pales its mission of decriminalizing 
sex work. 
CONCLUSION 
 As shown in this study, although all three NGOs serving the needs of sex workers have 
identical mission in minds from the outset, they deviate in their capacities to carry out the 
mission. Since Honghua operates in Hong Kong, it does not require state symbolic legitimation 
to operate effectively. Sufficient financial support and deep social embeddedness both add up 
fulfilling its role as a legal advocate, mediating between sex workers and the local state to 
advocate for more legal rights. Its capacity was contrasted by RSC and HOL’s incapacity in 
continuation to carry out their shared political mission; only the two deviate from the original 
goal in different ways. While lack in state symbolic legitimation subjects RSC to repressions that 
eventually transformed it to provide innocuous therapeutic services, an excess of the legitimation 
drives HOL to self-sanitize its radical edge to match with its status.  
Extending NGO institutional embeddedness literature which study NGOs in China as 
entangled in relations with various actors, this paper delineates how NGOs leverage relationships 
to mobilize resources that achieve different results in their political capacities. While NGOs are 
subject to meet different requirements of resources to operate effectively under distinct political 
contexts, they also vary in ways to deploy combination of these resources, utilizing them to 
justify their tactics. In this way, NGOs in China are neither total pawns coopted by state system 
as service providers, nor bold facilitator of democracy. Instead, the between and within variation 
in the three NGOs captured in this study show that they are at once caught in the political 
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economy of a larger context and mobilizing various resources to negotiate its own objectives. 
Therefore, futures studies on Chinese NGOs should take into account the pathways these NGOs 
come along to either failure or success of their political missions.  
 While this study acknowledges importance of relationships between local Chinese NGOs 
and international donors, the analysis focused more on their relations with the state and their 
constituencies. Future studies can explore how the ways that NGOs leverage their relationships 
with international actors or other civil society groups can interact with other means to obtain 
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